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Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the
Grand Irony of ERISA
Paul M. Secunda*
“[T]he combination [of the employee’s] state cause of action [being]
preempted by ERISA even while ERISA denies him any alternative
remedy . . . is disappointingly pernicious to the very goals and desires
1
that motivated Congress to enact pension laws in the first place.”
— Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr.
Congress enacted the Employee Retiree Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to protect
employees’ retirement and welfare benefits. Nevertheless, the Act has been interpreted by
the U.S Supreme Court over the years to be in essence an Employers’ Security Act, with
employers using ERISA to shield themselves against employee benefits-related claims.
The flaw in the current ERISA scheme lies at the intersection of ERISA’s preemption and
remedial provisions. Courts broadly interpret the preemption provisions of ERISA to
invalidate employee benefits-related state laws and then force employees to depend on an
inadequate, “comprehensive and reticulated” remedial scheme. This “intersectionality”
problem leads to a state of affairs that is contrary to ERISA’s purpose of protecting the
interests of participants and beneficiaries by “providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” To cure what currently ails ERISA,
this Article proposes three alternative reforms—one judicial and two legislative. The
judicial approach would call for the Court to adopt a remedialist approach, which would
be in line both with Congress’s intent to incorporate most of the common law of trusts
into ERISA, and also consistent with a modern interpretation of a remedial statute.
Additionally, Congress should reexamine and reject the far-fetched analogy between
ERISA, enacted in 1974, and the “days of the divided bench” analysis and provide an
express and expansive definition for “appropriate equitable relief” under proposed
section 3(43). Finally, Congress should pass an ERISA Civil Rights Act under proposed
section 502(a)(11), which, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in the Title VII context, would
permit capped, compensatory, and punitive damage awards in appropriate cases.

* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. An earlier draft of this Article
was presented as part of the 2009 Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal Symposium, The Grand
Irony of ERISA?: Intersectionality of ERISA Preemption and Remedial Issues. For their helpful
suggestions on this paper, I would like to thank Debra Davis, Albert Feuer, Stephen D. Rosenberg,
Susan Harthill, and Paul Mollica.
1. Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting).
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Introduction
Congress enacted the Employee Retiree Income Security Act of
2
1974 (ERISA or “the Act”) to protect employees’ retirement and
3
welfare benefits. Nevertheless, the Act has been interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court over the years to be in essence an Employers’ Security
Act, with employers using ERISA to shield themselves against employee
4
benefits-related claims.
The flaw in the current ERISA scheme lies at the intersection of
ERISA’s preemption and remedial provisions. Courts broadly interpret
the preemption provisions of ERISA under section 514 to invalidate
benefits-related state laws and then force employees to depend on an
5
inadequate, “comprehensive and reticulated” remedial scheme under
section 502(a). This intersectionality problem leads to a state of affairs
that is contrary to ERISA’s purpose of protecting the interests of
participants and beneficiaries “by providing for appropriate remedies,
6
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”
The Court has accomplished this feat of perverting congressional
intent by choosing to elevate a secondary purpose of ERISA over its
primary one. While the primary purpose of ERISA is clearly stated in
7
the Act to be the protection of employees’ benefits, the Court has

2. ERISA §§ 2–4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). Following the practice of other ERISA
scholarship, the text of this Article refers to the original section numbers as enacted by ERISA, rather
than to the United State Code section numbers.
3. Section 2 of ERISA contains the “findings and declarations of policy.” Specifically, it states:
“It is hereby declared to be the policy of [the Act] to protect interstate commerce and the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b); see Boggs v.
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997) (“The principal object of the statute is to protect plan participants and
beneficiaries.”); Mass. v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112 (1989) (“ERISA was passed by Congress in 1974
to safeguard employees from the abuse and mismanagement of funds that had been accumulated to
finance various types of employee benefits.”); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”:
The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317,
1365–66 (2003) (“Congress federalized the law of pension and benefit plan administration for the
primary purpose of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries through a triple regime of
mandatory trusteeship, extensive fiduciary duties, and commensurate remedies.”).
4. See Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA
Fiduciary Law, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 391, 392 (2000) (“Only in the realm of private sector
employee benefit plans . . . have fiduciaries been able to turn their status as fiduciaries, a status that
once required ‘the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,’ into a shield against liability.” (footnote
omitted) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928))); see also Colleen E. Medill,
Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 827, 829–30 (2006) (“Plan participants who enter this labyrinth find that, contrary to their
expectations, federal law does not protect their rights concerning plan benefits.”).
5. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (quoting Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52
(1987) (“The civil enforcement scheme of § 502(a) is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the
stated purposes of ERISA.”).
7. See supra note 3.
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instead emphasized a subsidiary policy of containing employee benefits
8
plan costs. In doing so, the Court’s ostensible goal is to ensure that
9
employers continue to voluntarily adopt ERISA plans. Yet, this
restrictive approach is contrary to the remedial nature of the legislation,
and the elevation of this secondary purpose consistently favors employer
interests.
10
Unlike some ERISA commentators, I believe that the legislative
history of ERISA clearly rejects the idea that these “right without
remedy” cases arise because of a compromise entered into by employer
and employee group advocates at the time of ERISA’s enactment.
Although ERISA’s broad preemptive reach was calculated and
11
intentional, there is no similar evidence that Congress meant there to be
a limited remedial scheme for protecting employee benefits. Nothing in
the legislative record, the views of the so-called literalist Justices to the
12
contrary notwithstanding, evinces Congress’s intent to say all that it
13
intended to say on particular remedies. Instead, it is the Supreme Court
that has blundered in its incorporation of inappropriate trust law
14
analogies in this area of the law. In short, intersectionality is a problem

8. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981) (noting that ERISA’s
primary goal was to benefit employees and that a secondary goal was to contain costs).
9. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990); see also Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely:
Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 Cornell J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 361, 400 (2002) (“Any suggestion for pension reform must be assessed in light of the reality
that pension plan sponsorship is voluntary. ERISA imposes significant substantive regulation on
pension plans, but leaves the decision whether to offer a pension plan in the first place to
employers.”).
10. See, e.g., More on that Grand Irony Theory, http://www.bostonerisalaw.com/archives/benefitlitigation-more-on-that-grand-irony-theory.html (Dec. 3, 2007) (“ERISA simply leaves some harms
incapable of remediation, something that is understood to have simply been part of the balancing act
engaged in by Congress in enacting the statute, in which a decision was made to grant only limited
rights of recovery in exchange for enacting a statute that would encourage the creation of employee
benefits.”).
11. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1987) (“We have observed in the past
that the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive . . . .”); see also Stephen
F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian Ethos of ERISA
Preemption, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2000) (“A review of ERISA’s legislative history and postenactment amendments suggests that this Congressional silence was intentional and, more
importantly, consistent in purpose with the broad scope of preemption announced by the Court nearly
two decades ago.”).
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See S. Rep. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (describing
Senate version of enforcement provisions as intended to “provide both the Secretary and participants
and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]”); H.R. Rep.
No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 (describing House version in
identical terms).
14. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319 (“When federalizing the administration of pension and
employee benefit plans in ERISA, Congress made a deliberate choice to subject these plans to the
pre-existing regime of trust law rather than to invent a new regulatory structure.”); see also Susan
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under the current scheme not because of a broad preemption scheme
alone, but because of the impact of this broad preemption coupled with a
limited ERISA remedial scheme.
To cure what currently ails ERISA, this Article proposes three legal
reforms—one judicial and two legislative. The judicial approach would
call for the Court to adopt a remedialist approach, which would be in line
both with Congress’s intent to incorporate most of the common law of
15
trusts into ERISA, and also consistent with a modern interpretation of
a remedial statute. Only to the extent that there were intended to be
deviations from that common law should the unique characteristics of the
16
ERISA statute be considered in applying the remedial provisions.
Congress should also take steps to expand the remedies available
under ERISA. To effect this recalibration, Congress should reexamine
and reject the far-fetched analogy between ERISA, enacted in 1974, and
17
“the days of the divided bench” analysis offered up by Justice Scalia in
18
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates. Congress should overrule Mertens by
providing an express and expansive definition for “appropriate equitable
relief” under my proposal for a new section 3(43). Additionally,
Congress could pass an ERISA Civil Rights Act under my proposal for a
new section 502(a)(11), which, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in the
19
Title VII context, would permit capped, compensatory, and punitive
damage awards in appropriate cases.
This Article is divided into four Parts. The first Part briefly provides
an overview of the present state of ERISA law in the preemption and
remedial areas. In the second Part, the Article discusses the

Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” Relief Is
Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 Okla. L. Rev. 721, 723 (2008) (deconstructing
traditional trust law to determine whether make-whole relief was typically available for breaches of
fiduciary duty and concluding that such relief was available, although it is an ill-fitting form of relief
for modern ERISA employee welfare benefits plans).
15. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (“[W]e recognize that these fiduciary duties
draw much of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans
before ERISA’s enactment.”); see also Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (“[R]ather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of
trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope
of their authority and responsibility.”).
16. Varity, 516 U.S. at 497 (“[W]e believe that the law of trusts often will inform, but will not
necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties. In some
instances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to
what extent, the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from commonlaw trust requirements.”).
17. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002).
18. 508 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1993); Langbein, supra note 3, at 1361 (“It was Justice Scalia, or rather,
the five-member Supreme Court majority assembled for his opinions, and not Congress, which gave
the term [appropriate equitable relief] the unnatural and dysfunctional meaning propounded in
Mertens and Great-West.”).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006).
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intersectionality problem and provides illustrations of cases that
demonstrate the nature of this problem. The third Part first examines the
debate between the literalist and remedialist Justices on the Court over
the years and then offers a judicial fix to this intersectionality problem by
applying the rationale of remedialist Justices to these intersectionality
cases. To the extent that the judicial recalibration does not lead to an
adequately remedial statute, the fourth Part suggests that Congress
define more broadly “appropriate equitable relief” in proposed
section 3(43), or take more dramatic steps and enact an ERISA Civil
Rights Act under section 502(a)(11), modeled on the Civil Rights Act of
1991.

I. Brief Overview of the Remedial and
Preemption Provisions of ERISA
ERISA is a complex statute covering an extensive area of law. It
“protects employee pensions and other benefits by providing
insurance . . . , specifying certain plan characteristics in detail . . . , and by
setting forth certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the
20
management of both pension and nonpension benefits plans.” Although
21
employers are not required to offer employee benefits plans, once such
plans are adopted, ERISA provides the applicable legal framework.
This Part of the Article examines the roots of the intersectionality
problem that I identify at the junction of the remedial and preemption
provisions of the Act. The first section explores the intentionally-broad
preemption provisions of section 514 of the Act. The second section then
considers the restrictive interpretation given to ERISA’s remedial
provisions under section 502(a).
A. ERISA’s Broad Preemption Scheme
Section 514 of ERISA is a broadly-written preemption provision
that permits ERISA to supersede any state law that “relate[s] to”
22
employee benefits plans. A state law may nevertheless be saved from
ERISA preemption if it regulates insurance, securities, or banking under
23
“the savings clause.” However, even if the state law regulates insurance,

20. Varity, 516 U.S. at 496.
21. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires
employers to establish employee benefits plans.”).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). State laws are defined expansively to include “all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State.” Id. § 1144(c)(1). If the
law in question relating to an employee benefits plan is either a state criminal law or another federal
law, ERISA preemption does not apply. Id. § 1144(b)(4), (d).
23. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”).
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it may still be preempted under section 514(b)(2)(B), known as the
24
“deemer clause,” if the state law is being applied to a self-insured plan.
Because the “relate to” language of section 514 potentially has no
25
meaningful limit, the Supreme Court has struggled to bring some
26
coherence to this provision. The Court’s attempts can be broadly
broken down into the early preemption cases and the modern
preemption cases. In the end, however, ERISA preemption largely
maintains its expansive characteristics, consistent with the aims of its
legislative drafters.
1. The “Relates to” Analysis Under Section 514(a)
a. The Early Preemption Cases
The early preemption cases applied a broad, field preemption
approach under which ERISA was thought to completely occupy the
field of employee benefits law. For instance, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., three employers provided ERISA-covered medical plans to their
27
employees. These plans failed to provide benefits to pregnant
28
employees as mandated by New York state laws. In deciding whether
the New York laws were preempted by ERISA, the Court interpreted
the “relates to” language in section 514(a) to mean that a state law is
preempted if it makes “reference to” or has a “connection with” an
29
ERISA plan. The Court concluded that the New York laws requiring
pregnancy coverage had a connection with employee benefits laws
30
because the New York laws mandated what the plans had to cover. In
coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that “[t]he breadth of
31
§ 514(a)’s pre-emptive reach is apparent from that section’s language.”
The Court also delved into ERISA’s legislative history and pointed out
that “[t]he bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited preemption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific
subjects covered by ERISA. The Conference Committee rejected these

24. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B).
25. See N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
656 (1995) (“If ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all
practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, relations stop
nowhere.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Henry James, Roderick Hudson, at xli (N.Y. ed., World’s
Classics 1980))).
26. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808 (1997) (“This is
another Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-emption case.”); Pilot Life
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (noting the “statutory complexity of ERISA’s three pre-emption
provisions”).
27. 463 U.S. 85, 92 (1983).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 96–97.
30. Id. at 97.
31. Id. at 96.
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provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that the
32
section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.”
Cases subsequent to Shaw continued to emphasize the expansive
scope of ERISA preemption. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,
33
Dedeaux injured his back while working for his employer. He was
covered under a long-term disability insurance plan covered by ERISA,
and although he initially received coverage for his back ailment, the
34
benefits were terminated by Pilot Life after two years. Thereafter,
Dedeaux’s benefits were reinstated a number of times, and Dedeaux
sought to bring a number of common-law, bad faith insurance claims
35
under Mississippi state tort and contract law. The Court held, however,
that state tort and contracts claims alleging improper processing of a
benefits claim were preempted by ERISA because the state law claims
36
clearly related to the administration of an ERISA plan.
In another early case, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, the Court
37
examined the “reference to” aspect of the Shaw test. In that case, an
employer terminated an employee in “a companywide reduction in
38
force.” The employee claimed that the true reason for terminating him
39
was so that he could not vest in his pension. Rather than suing under
section 510 of ERISA, which provides a remedy for interference with
40
ERISA rights, the employee sued under the Texas common law of
41
contract and tort. The Court concluded that the state wrongful42
discharge action was preempted. In particular, the Court found the
state-law claim preempted because it made “reference to” an ERISA
plan and since the existence of, and participation in, the plan was an
43
essential element of the Texas state law action.
In all, the early preemption cases are characterized by a very broad
44
field preemption approach. Consequently, most state constitutional,

32. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5162; S. Rep. No. 93-1090, at 383 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)).
33. 481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 43–44.
36. Id. at 48 (“The common law causes of action raised in Dedeaux’s complaint, each based on
alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan, undoubtedly meet
the criteria for pre-emption under § 514(a).”).
37. 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
38. Id. at 135.
39. Id. at 135–36.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
41. Ingersoll, 498 U.S. at 136.
42. Id. at 140.
43. Id. The later Supreme Court case of California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Construction, 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997), makes clear that the “reference to” preemption test
may also be satisfied by establishing that the state law purports to regulate ERISA plans exclusively.
44. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
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statutory, and common law claims that in any way related to employee
benefits were superseded and plaintiffs would have to find whatever
remedy they had under ERISA.
b. Modern Preemption Cases
At first blush, modern preemption cases appeared to abandon the
broader field preemption approach in favor of a more narrow conflict
45
preemption approach. Under this new doctrine, a state cause of action
is preempted only to the extent that it is impossible to comply with both
ERISA and the state law or where the state law interferes with the
46
purposes and objectives of ERISA.
The seminal case that introduces this paradigm shift in ERISA
preemption law is New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
47
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. In Travelers, New York’s
Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology statute regulated in48
patient hospital rates in New York. Different diagnostic-related groups
49
(DRGs) were established and set up the average cost of these services.
The catch was that a preference existed for patients with Blue Cross/Blue
50
Shield insurance, Medicaid, and HMOs. Such patients were billed for
hospital services at the lower DRG rate, while others were charged at the
51
DRG rate plus a twenty-four percent surcharge. Several nonpreferred
insurers brought a claim to have the New York statute declared invalid
52
on the basis of ERISA preemption.
Travelers starts by changing the starting point of the ERISA
preemption analysis:
[W]e have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state
regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law. Indeed, in cases like this one, where federal law is said to bar state
action in fields of traditional state regulation, we have worked on the
“assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be

45. See generally DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808–09
(1997) (finding that a state statute imposing a tax on ERISA-funded medical centers was not
preempted); Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 319 (finding that prevailing wage laws for apprentices did not
relate to ERISA plans); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 661 (1995) (finding that state regulation of health care costs did not relate to employee
benefits plans within the meaning of ERISA section 514).
46. See Larry J. Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretation of ERISA’s Preemption and Saving
Clauses: In Support of a State Law Preemption of Section 1132(a) of ERISA’s Civil Enforcement
Provisions, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 593, 598 (2004).
47. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
48. Id. at 649.
49. Id. at 649–50.
50. Id. at 650.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 651–52.

140

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:131

superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
53
purpose of Congress.”

In other words, Travelers represents a paradigm shift from field
preemption to conflict preemption which potentially could leave a wider
swath of state laws untouched by ERISA. It purports to create a
rebuttable presumption against ERISA preemption if traditional areas of
54
state law are involved.
To determine whether preemption applies, the Travelers Court
directs that essentially two questions be addressed: (1) whether there are
compelling policy reasons under ERISA to preempt state law; and (2) if
55
so, does the state law undermine these policy objectives? According to
the Court, such compelling policy reasons are undermined by state law in
instances where the law mandates the type of benefits a plan must
56
provide and where the law interferes too much with a secondary policy
57
of ERISA: nationally uniform administration of employee benefits
58
plans. On the other hand, the New York state law in Travelers was not
preempted because it only had an indirect economic influence on the
59
pricing of insurance policies. Such an impact might influence the
decisions of plan sponsors in selecting a health insurer, but not to the
necessary degree to interfere with the national policy of benefits
60
uniformity.
Although the new language under Travelers suggests that the scope
of ERISA preemption should not have been as expansive in the modern
era as it was in the early preemption cases, many state laws in the
61
intervening years have not survived ERISA preemption. At first, it
53. Id. at 654–55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 658–63.
56. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727–28 (1985).
57. Because this policy is only in legislative history and court cases, I refer to it as a “secondary
policy,” as opposed to the primary purpose in ERISA of protecting employee benefits.
58. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657. “The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid
a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee
benefit plans.” Id. The Court over the years has found that several types of state laws interfere too
much with the policy of national uniformity and, therefore, relate to an employee benefits plan. See,
e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (state law regulating plan participant’s beneficiary
designation); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (state law making employer
agent of insurance company). On the other hand, there are state laws that only indirectly interfere
with these same ERISA policy objectives, and are not preempted. See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. 645
(state law imposing surcharge on health care plan insurer or plan assets); Cal. Div. of Labor Stds.
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (state law regulating wages paid to
apprentices at public construction work projects); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs.
Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997) (state law imposing a tax on hospitals, most of which do not operate ERISA
plans).
59. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
60. Id. at 662.
61. See infra notes 68–84 and accompanying text.
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appeared that the Court would follow fairly closely its new approach to
preemption. For instance, in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical
Services Fund, a mere two years after Travelers, the Court examined a
New York state law which imposed a direct tax on a plan asset (a
62
hospital that provided services for participants and their beneficiaries).
Finding that the state law was “a tax on hospitals,” and that, “[m]ost
hospitals are not owned or operated by ERISA funds, the Court found
the law not preempted because it did not interfere too much with the
63
underlying policy of ERISA. One can argue about whether this law had
a direct impact on plan administration, but the Court apparently decided
that certain laws designed to subsidize health care financing are more in
64
an area of traditional state concern.
Similarly, in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
65
Dillingham Construction, involving the application of a state livingwage ordinance to apprentices on public construction work projects, the
Court limited the “reference to” prong of the Shaw preemption test to a
narrower one: the question now is whether the state law is in reference
66
exclusively to an ERISA plan. In other words, does the state law
exclusively regulate ERISA plans or does it also regulate non-ERISA
plans? If the latter, then the state law does not make “reference to”
67
ERISA for purposes of preemption. Thus, Dillingham represents yet
another step back from the field preemption approach and a narrowing
of ERISA preemption.
Yet, a more recent case might suggest a trend back to an expansive
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause. The family law case of
68
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff is a case in point. David Egelhoff initially
designated his second wife, Donna Rae, as the beneficiary of his life
69
insurance policy and pension plan. They later divorced, and before he
70
could change the beneficiary designation, he died in a car accident. His
children from his first marriage claimed they were owed the proceeds of
71
the policy. They argued that a Washington state statute made the
designation of the proceeds to Donna Rae void because the state law
assumed that David would not want to assign his benefits to his

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

520 U.S. 806, 810 (1997).
Id. at 816.
See id.
519 U.S. 316 (1997).
Id. at 324–25. Because that was not the case in Dillingham, the state law survived. Id. at 319.
Id.
532 U.S. 141 (2001).
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
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72

estranged wife. Donna Rae argued that the state law was preempted
73
and ERISA permitted her to keep the funds as the named beneficiary.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Washington law was preempted
74
even though family law is an area of traditional state concern. The
majority found that the law interfered too much with “the payment of
75
benefits, a central matter of plan administration,” and the uniformity of
76
plan administration for the company, and noted that the Court has “not
hesitated to find state family law pre-empted when it conflicts with
77
ERISA or relates to ERISA plans.” Moreover, the Court reasoned, the
lack of uniformity in plan administration would discourage employers
from voluntarily setting up pension plans and life insurance policies,
78
which would be contrary to a core policy concern of ERISA.
Egelhoff thus represents a shift back to a broader preemption
scheme based on plan cost and uniform-administration concerns. Other
preemption cases from around the same time as Egelhoff similarly have
applied an expansive concept of preemption to find state laws to be
79
preempted.
An even more recent example of the continuing expansive quality of
ERISA preemption comes from a much ballyhooed appellate case
80
involving Wal-Mart and the provision of health care to its workers.
81
Maryland passed “Fair Share Health Care” legislation, which would
have required Wal-Mart to spend eight percent of its payroll on health
82
insurance costs for its employees. In Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v.
Fielder, a trade association representing Wal-Mart challenged the

72. Id. at 144–45.
73. Id. at 146.
74. Id. at 151.
75. Id. at 148.
76. Id. at 148–49.
77. Id. at 151.
78. Id. at 149–50 (“Requiring ERISA administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States and
to contend with litigation would undermine the congressional goal of ‘minimiz[ing] the administrative
and financial burden[s]’ on plan administrators—burdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990))).
However, it is not even clear that an increase in plan administration costs actually causes fewer
adoptions of employee benefits plans. Since most benefits are outsourced to major insurers or
financial companies, which then spread the costs across numerous plans, is there really a cost impact at
all on the typical employer, as the Court suggests? Thanks to Stephen Rosenberg of the McCormack
Firm, LLC, for his insights on this topic.
79. See, e.g., UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 364 (1999) (finding state law
making employer agent of insurance company preempted).
80. See Stephanie Armour, Maryland First to OK ‘Wal-Mart bill’, USA Today, Jan. 12, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2006-01-12-walmart-maryland_x.htm.
81. Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2008).
82. The bill applies to all employers with over 10,000 Maryland employees, but the other three
employers in Maryland who fell into that category had already spent at least eight percent of payroll
on health insurance costs. See Armour, supra note 80.
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83

Maryland law on ERISA preemption grounds. The Fourth Circuit held
that the Fair Share law interfered too much with the uniform
administration of Wal-Mart’s health plan and, therefore, was preempted
84
as having a “connection with” an ERISA plan.
In the last year, however, new signs indicate that the scope of
ERISA preemption may again be narrowing. A similar Fair Share law
was enacted in San Francisco requiring medium and large employers in
the city to make minimum health care expenditures on behalf of covered
employees, either by paying into their own employee benefits plans or
85
into a fund maintained and administered by the city. In Golden Gate
Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, the Golden Gate
Restaurant Association challenged this law on behalf of its membership
86
on ERISA preemption grounds. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the San
Francisco health-care law was not preempted by ERISA because such
preemption is restricted in state-law areas that historically involve
87
matters “of local concern” like the provision of health care and the San
Francisco ordinance “offer[ed] employers a meaningful alternative that
88
allow[ed] them to preserve the existing structure of their ERISA plans.”
89
Golden Gate thus again narrows the scope of ERISA preemption.
Yet, the Ninth Circuit’s decision appears to be an outlier at this point and
it may still be overturned on appeal. It is more likely that the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts will continue to find many state-law
claims preempted under an expansive notion of the “relates to” language
of section 514 based on concerns of cost and national uniformity in the
administration of employee benefits plans.
2. Further Broadening of ERISA Preemption: The Impact of the
Savings and Deemer Clauses
The “relate to” language of section 514(a) is not the end of the
preemption analysis. The savings clause generally still keeps state laws
regulating insurance, banking, and securities free from ERISA

83. 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 183. The reader may recall that in finding that the Maryland law had a “connection
with” employee benefits plans, the court was really indicating that the state law was preempted
because it was “related to” an ERISA-governed employee benefits plan. See id. at 192.
85. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Golden Gate Restaurant Association: Employer Mandates and
ERISA Preemption in the Ninth Circuit, 47 State Tax Notes 603, 603 (2008).
86. 546 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3691 (U.S. June 5, 2009)
(No. 08–1515).
87. Id. at 647 (quoting N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)).
88. Id. at 660.
89. Id. at 654 (“We read Travelers as narrowing the Court’s interpretation of the scope of
§ 514(a).”).
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90

preemption. At the same time, the deemer clause provides a route back
91
into preemption for self-insured health plans.
With regard to the savings clause, consider its narrow operation in
92
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux. Recall that the Mississippi
common law contract and tort claims for benefits were found to be
93
“related to” ERISA. However, of equal importance, the Court gave a
94
restrictive gloss to the meaning of a “state law regulating insurance”
95
under the savings clause. Here, the Court held that the plaintiff’s claim
had its “roots” grounded in state tort and contract law, and thus did not
qualify as a law regulating insurance, which would have been saved from
96
preemption. So although the savings clause is set up to diminish the
scope of ERISA preemption, it has been interpreted in a way that leads
97
to many state common law claims being preempted.
On the other hand, the deemer clause is broadly construed to keep
more claims within ERISA preemption. For instance, in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, the question presented was whether a self-funded health
98
benefits plan was subject to a Pennsylvania antisubrogation law. The
preemption analysis concluded that the Pennsylvania law was preempted
99
because it was “relate[d] to” an employee benefits plan and also
determined that the law was subsequently saved as a law that regulated
100
insurance. However, applying the deemer clause, the self-insured
employer was not deemed to be an insurance company for purposes of
101
the Pennsylvania antisubrogation law. The upshot is that FMC Corp.
and other self-insured employers are exempted from state laws that

90. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006).
91. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
92. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
93. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
95. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50.
96. Id.
97. It is still unclear whether the recent modification of the test for determining which state laws
regulate insurance under Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2002), will
change the result of cases like Pilot Life. See E. Farish Percy, Applying the Common Fund Doctrine to
an ERISA-Governed Employee Benefit Plan’s Claim for Subrogation or Reimbursement, 61 Fla. L.
Rev. 55, 60–61 (2009) (“Even though the Miller test broadened the scope of the savings clause, at least
one lower court has recently applied the test in a manner inconsistent with congressional intent to save
state laws regulating insurance from preemption.” (footnote omitted) (referencing Levine v. United
Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005))).
98. 498 U.S. 52, 54 (1990). A subrogation clause requires a plan participant to reimburse the plan
for any benefits paid if the participant also recovers on a claim in a tort action against a third party. Id.
Pennsylvania had a law, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720
(1987), which prohibited plans from enforcing such subrogation provisions. 498 U.S. at 55.
99. 498 U.S. at 58.
100. Id. at 60–61.
101. Id. at 61 (“We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws
that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the meaning of the saving clause.” (alteration in original)).
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102

regulate insurance.
Not surprisingly, because of this dichotomy
between insured and self-insured health plans, a tremendous shift has
occurred in the United States in that many employers are setting up selffunded health plans to avoid state insurance regulation and more state103
law actions are consequently being preempted under ERISA.
In short, the operation of the savings and deemer clauses, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, has contributed to maintaining the
broad scope of ERISA preemption.
B. ERISA’s Limited Remedial Provisions
Separate and apart from the mostly expansive readings given to
ERISA preemption provisions is the constricted interpretation given to
the remedial provisions under section 502(a). This narrow reading stems
from one of the first remedies cases, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
104
Co. v. Russell. Although the Court in Russell was unanimous on the
specific question before it—deciding there were no compensatory or
punitive damages under the breach of fiduciary provisions of section
105
502(a)(2) —more importantly the Justices divided into camps regarding
the proper way to interpret the structure of section 502(a).
The majority in Russell advocated a literalist approach to statutory
106
construction that narrowly read the remedies available under ERISA.
In this regard, the five-Justice majority wrote:
The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in
§ 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted . . . provide strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply
forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent
omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of
ERISA’s interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial
scheme, which is in turn part of a “comprehensive and reticulated
statute.” . . .
We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted
107
with such evident care as the one in ERISA.

102. See id.
103. See Colleen Medill, Introduction to Employee Benefits Law: Policy and Practice 307
(2d ed. 2007) (“In 2006, 55% of workers with employer-sponsored health care coverage were enrolled
in a health care plan that was completely or partially self-insured by the employer.”).
104. 473 U.S. 134 (1985); see also Muir, supra note 4, at 434 (“As the first Supreme Court
precedent in the area, the opinion set the tone for ERISA remedial jurisprudence, particularly with
regard to the scope of available remedies.”). As will be argued in Part III.A, infra, what makes Russell
pivotal is that it creates an ideological divide between literalist and remedialist Justices that has now
lasted for almost twenty-five years.
105. 473 U.S. at 148.
106. 473 U.S. at 146–47.
107. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 466 U.S.
359, 361 (1980)).
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On the other hand, the four remedialist Justices in Russell believed
that trust law should be the starting point for the interpretation of these
108
remedial provisions. In particular, they argue that because of the
primacy of trust law in ERISA,
in resolving this and other questions concerning appropriate relief
under ERISA, courts should begin by ascertaining the extent to which
trust and pension law as developed by state and federal courts provide
for recovery by the beneficiary above and beyond the benefits that
have been withheld; this is the logical first step, given that Congress
109
intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s equitable remedies.

Applying this logic to Russell, because compensatory and punitive
damages were not available as equitable remedies under trust law, the
remedialist Justices had no problem agreeing that these remedies were
110
not available under section 502(a)(2). That being said, they viewed
ERISA primarily as a remedial statute and believed it should be
interpreted broadly to meet its stated purpose of protecting employee
111
benefits.
These statutory construction arguments pervade the analysis of the
112
three major types of civil enforcement provisions of ERISA: section
502(a)(1)(B) claims are instituted to recover benefits, to enforce rights
113
under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. Section 502(a)(2),
read together with section 409, provides for breach of fiduciary duty
claims and permits personal liability against individual fiduciaries to
114
make the plan whole. Finally, section 502(a)(3) enjoins any act or
practice which violates ERISA, but is limited to claims for “appropriate
115
equitable relief.” This section examines each of these remedial sections
seriatim.
1. Claims for Benefits Under Section 502(a)(1)(B)
Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims are brought by a plan participant or
116
beneficiary against the plan for the value of denied benefits or rights.
For instance, if a plan participant wishes to receive a particular heart
procedure under his or her health plan and the plan administrator denies
the claim, the participant may file a claim against the plan for recovery of

108. See infra notes 109–11.
109. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted).
110. See id. at 150.
111. See id. at 155–56.
112. There are other civil actions under section 502(a), including a claim under section
502(a)(1)(A) for refusal to supply requested plan information, but this discussion focuses on the three
most frequently utilized civil enforcement sections. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006). ERISA also
provides for potential criminal penalties for willful violations of the Act. See id. § 1131.
113. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
114. Id. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109.
115. Id. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
116. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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the value of that heart procedure. However, other forms of consequential
relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, do not appear to
117
be available under section 502(a)(1)(B). The lack of monetary relief is
a dispositive reason why many employer-defendants would rather try
these claims under ERISA, rather than under a state law wrongful death
claim or other tort.
Furthermore, section 502(a)(1)(B) contains a tricky procedural
landscape for ERISA plaintiffs to manage. First, it is the only remedial
118
provision that currently requires exhaustion of internal remedies.
Consequently, by the time these claims make it to federal court, the
procedural posture is that of a review of a denial of benefits claim by the
plan administrator. Second, and making matters worse for ERISA
plaintiffs, is the fact that the standard of judicial review is highly
119
deferential under Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch. Although the
Court determined that the default review standard was de novo, as long
as the company places the authority to decide benefits determinations
within the plan administrator’s discretion, the resulting benefits
determinations will be upheld as long as they are not arbitrary or
120
capricious. Indeed, even if the plan administrator is the entity that both
pays benefits and determines eligibility for benefits, Metlife v. Glenn
stands for the proposition that the subsequent conflict is just one factor
to be considered, under the totality of circumstances, by a court in
deciding whether the benefits determination should be upheld under the
121
arbitrary or capricious standard. In all, it will probably surprise no one
to learn that plaintiffs win very few benefits claims in federal or state
122
court under section 502(a)(1)(B), and even when they do, the remedy

117. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (“[Section 502(a)(1)(B)] says
nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages, or about the possible consequences of delay
in the plan administrators’ processing of a disputed claim.”).
118. Exhaustion is mandated by section 503 and the regulations thereunder. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133;
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2009). This means that once a claim has been denied by a plan administrator,
the plan participant must file an appeal with the administrator and wait for a further adverse
determination before bringing his or her benefits claim in state or federal court. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031. Section 503 regulations set up various time limits by which a claim appeal must be filed and decided.
Id.
119. 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989).
120. Id. at 114–15.
121. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008) (“Often the entity that administers
the plan, such as an employer or an insurance company, both determines whether an employee is
eligible for benefits and pays benefits out of its own pockets. We here decide that this dual role creates
a conflict of interest; that a reviewing court should consider that conflict as a factor in determining
whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying benefits; and that the significance
of the factor will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.”).
122. One frequent litigator of section 502(a)(1)(B) claims responded to my inquiry on a listserv
about the success of these claims by stating that he almost never wins these cases if the abuse of
discretion standard applies. Posting of Mark DeBofsky, mdebofsky@ddbchicago.com, to
BENEFITSPROF-L@lists.ou.edu (Feb. 6, 2009) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Even if he
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available is often inadequate in relation to the harm suffered because of
123
the lack of consequential damages.
Thus, both the nature of the remedy under this section and the
standard of court review in these cases represent significant obstacles for
employees in receiving adequate relief for denial of benefits under
ERISA.
2. Claims For Fiduciary Breaches Under Section 502(a)(2)
If anything, the situation for ERISA plaintiffs might be worse under
section 502(a)(2) breach of fiduciary provisions, though there is reason
for hope for plaintiffs in the 401(k) pension plan context. Section
502(a)(2) directly incorporates section 409, which provides that
breaching fiduciaries are personally liable to only the plan to make good
124
for any losses, not to individual plan participants or beneficiaries. As
recounted above, this led the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Russell to unanimously determine that plaintiffs
125
may not recover compensatory or punitive damages under this section.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court recently found in LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., that an individual 401(k) account
holder could bring a section 502(a)(2) claim against the plan for losses
126
Thus, individual
caused to that account by the plan’s conduct.
participants in 401(k) plans may be able to receive relief for wrongful
conduct undertaken by a plan administrator with regard to their
127
accounts. However, and as will be discussed below, the concurring
opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in LaRue, which argues that the claim is
one for benefits under 502(a)(1)(B) and requires internal exhaustion like
128
benefits claims, might prove problematic for ERISA plaintiffs going
forward.
3. Claims for Equitable Relief Under Section 502(a)(3)
Because there is little individual relief available under the fiduciary
provisions of section 502(a)(2), a plaintiff seeking to recover on an
individual basis for a breach of fiduciary duty must look to section
502(a)(3). Yet section 502(a)(3), as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is
limited in important respects as a remedy for plaintiffs. First of all, the

does win, the court usually “remands” to the plan administrator so the plan administrator can come up
with new reasons to deny benefits, and, as a result, he ends up settling these cases (but only by taking a
huge discount on the value of these claims). Id.
123. See discussion infra Part II.B.
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109 (2006).
125. 473 U.S. 134, 138 (1985).
126. 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008). (“We therefore hold that although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a
remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery for
fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account.”).
127. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
128. 128 S. Ct. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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term “appropriate” in “appropriate equitable relief” appears to have
been interpreted to mean that its provisions can only provide relief if
129
there is no remedy available under sections 502(a)(1)(B) or 502(a)(2).
That being said, the potential scope of this section has been most
dramatically impacted by the interpretation of “equitable” in the case of
130
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates. In Mertens, Hewitt Associates was a plan
service provider who assisted in a breach of fiduciary duty in making
inaccurate actuarial predictions for the company’s defined benefits
131
plan. The question presented by the case was whether a nonfiduciary,
132
like Hewitt, could be found liable under section 502(a)(3).
Not only did the Supreme Court find that nonfiduciaries could not
be sued for assisting breaches of fiduciary duties under section 502(a)(3),
133
but the Court also discussed what types of remedies are permissible.
Purporting to rely on the meaning of equity during “the days of the
134
the Court inexplicably interpreted “appropriate
divided bench,”
135
equitable relief” to mean only “injunction, mandamus, and restitution.”
Money damages, such as compensatory or punitive damages, are
136
excluded.
This decision has sharply curtailed the nature of relief available
under section 502(a)(3) and has set into motion over the last fifteen years
a series of Supreme Court cases that can only be characterized as bizarre
and contrary to the original purposes of ERISA. For instance, in two
137
plan reimbursement cases, the Court has further divided restitution
into claims for legal restitution (not recoverable) and equitable
restitution (recoverable) in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
138
139
Knudson and Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. To

129. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
130. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
131. Id. at 250.
132. Id. at 251.
133. Id. at 261–62.
134. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002) (“the days of the
divided bench” refers to a time in American jurisprudence when there were separate courts of law and
equity).
135. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256. The Court’s interpretation is especially inexplicable because
mandamus was never a remedy in equity and restitution did not exist during the days of the divided
bench. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1353–54.
136. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
137. Plan reimbursement clauses in the self-insured health plan context are similar to subrogation
clauses in the insured plan context. The difference, however, is that whereas in a subrogation claim the
insurance company may sue the tortfeasor directly, in a reimbursement claim the participant must first
sue and recover from the third-party tortfeasor before the plan has a claim for reimbursement. See
FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1260 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1997).
138. 534 U.S. 204, 213–14 (2002).
139. 547 U.S. 356, 362–63 (2006). There is an argument that Sereboff actually might signal a retreat
from Great-West, by perhaps limiting Great-West to its facts. See Posting of Colleen Medill to
Workplace Prof Blog, Sereboff and the Future of ERISA Remedies, http://
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prevail under a theory of equitable restitution, an ERISA plaintiff must
show that the funds that the plan seeks to have reimbursed are
specifically identifiable funds in the possession of the defendant that
140
rightfully belong to the plaintiff. It is hard to believe that that was what
the ERISA drafters meant in providing for “appropriate equitable
141
relief.”
One question that still remains undecided is whether individuals
suing for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3) may recover
142
make-whole damages like back pay. It is clear, on the one hand, that
individual plaintiffs may seek to bring fiduciary claims for individual
143
equitable relief under Varity Corp. v. Howe. The forms of appropriate
equitable relief permitted in these cases, on the other hand, are
debatable because the Varity case itself included a concession by the
144
employer that the requested remedy was equitable.
It is therefore unclear whether the payment of a monetary award to
make the victims of the breach whole would be considered an equitable
145
remedy under section 502(a)(3). Also, there is some question under
wrongful discharge and retaliation cases under section 510 as to whether
146
participants may get back pay as a type of make-whole, equitable relief.

lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2006/05/sereboff_and_th.html (May 20, 2006, 11:06 pm)
(“After Sereboff, . . . the scope of potential remedies that could qualify as ‘equitable’ under Section
502(a)(3) is going to broaden out considerably, having been freed of strict compliance with all of the
possible (ancient) technical requirements for relief imposed by a chancery court of equity.”).
140. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362–63.
141. As Professor Langbein aptly put it, Russell, Mertens, and Great-West were “greeted with
despair in the scholarly and practitioner literature.” Langbein, supra note 3, at 1320; see, e.g., Randall
J. Gingiss, The ERISA Foxtrot: Current Jurisprudence Takes One Step Forward and One Step Back in
Protecting Participants’ Rights, 18 Va. Tax Rev. 417, 433 (1998); Muir, supra note 4, at 439; Karl J.
Stoecker, ERISA Remedies After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 9 DePaul Bus. L.J. 237, 243 (1997); Paul
O’Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants: Practical Assessment of a Neglected Issue in Health
Care Reform, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 723, 745–46 (1994); Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause and
the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 355, 435–
36 (1994); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants’ Rights by Expanding
the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 671, 673–74 (1994).
142. Back pay generally refers to restoring a plaintiff to the “status quo ante”; that is, to the
position he or she would have occupied had his or her ERISA rights not been violated. See Lorraine
Schmall & Nathan Ihnes, Failure of Equity: Discriminatory Plant Closings as an Irremediable Injury
Under ERISA, 55 Cath. U. L. Rev. 81, 117–18 (2005). But see Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
368 F.3d 1246, 1257–59 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that back pay is available as an
equitable remedy under ERISA simply because it is considered equitable under Title VII, reasoning
that ERISA protects the integrity of pension and health care plans generally whereas Title VII is a
make-whole statute).
143. 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
144. Id. at 508.
145. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223–34 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
146. For an argument that the Great-West decision does not permit back pay for wrongful
termination as an equitable remedy under section 502(a)(3), see Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
368 F.3d 1246, 1257–59 (10th Cir. 2004), which holds that back pay as equitable relief is not available
under section 502(a)(3) for violation of section 510. For criticisms of this approach and holding, see
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Some Justices have even beseeched Congress to clarify these issues by
147
legislating in this area.
In all, then, the combination of limited remedies for denial of
benefits claims and the narrow construal of breach of fiduciary claims
and other types of claims for ERISA violations has meant that the
Supreme Court has largely been successful in limiting the remedies
available for plaintiffs under ERISA.

II. The ERISA Intersectionality Problem
Having set forth the roots of the intersectionality problem through a
discussion of the current state of ERISA preemption and remedies in
Part I, this Part first seeks to examine the matter in which
intersectionality cases arise, with a focus on the concepts of complete
preemption and conflict preemption. Second, it explores a number of
cases that demonstrate this problem in action.
A. The Characteristics of ERISA Intersectionality Problems
The recognition of intersectionality problems has existed at least
since Judge Stanley Birch dissented in the 1992 case of Sanson v. General
148
Motors Corp. There, Judge Birch noted that the combined impact of
ERISA’s broad preemption provisions and its limited remedial
provisions act together to defeat the primary purpose of ERISA to
149
protect employee benefits. Both the doctrines of complete preemption
and conflict preemption contribute to the ERISA intersectionality
problem. Complete preemption operates so that states are not free to
pass laws that would add additional remedies to the current ERISA
150
remedial scheme. Under conflict preemption, plaintiffs are forced out
of state court to seek relief for wrongful acts of employers and plan
administrators and must bring their claims under the narrow ERISA
151
Finally, conflict preemption works to help
remedial framework.
preempt state laws that are otherwise saved as laws regulating insurance

Schmall & Ihnes, supra note 142, at 118, and see also Harthill, supra note 14, at 723.
147. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
148. 966 F.2d 618, 623 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 625 (“[T]he combination [of the employee’s] state cause of action [being] preempted by
ERISA even while ERISA denies him any alternative remedy . . . is disappointingly pernicious to the
very goals and desires that motivated Congress to enact pension laws in the first place.”).
150. Davila, 542 U.S. at 216 (“Congress’ intent to make the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism
exclusive would be undermined if state causes of action that supplement the ERISA § 502(a) remedies
were permitted, even if the elements of the state cause of action did not precisely duplicate the
elements of an ERISA claim.”)
151. Id. at 217–18 (“Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, . . . even a state law that can
arguably be characterized as ‘regulating insurance’ will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle
to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s remedial scheme.”)
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under ERISA’s saving clause. In short, once intersectionality analysis is
applied in all of its dimensions, there is little left for ERISA plaintiffs
except for the exclusive, limited, and ineffectual remedial scheme under
section 502(a).
1. Complete Preemption and Intersectionality
Starting with the case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
153
Taylor, the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of complete
preemption within the ERISA context. Taylor explains, in the context of
a state-law claim for disability benefits, that Congress intended to so
completely preempt employee benefits law through enactment of ERISA
that any state-law complaint raising a claim for denial of employment
154
benefits is necessarily federal in character. This means that such state
denial of benefits claims can be removed to federal court and treated like
155
an ERISA claim. Put differently, “the ERISA civil enforcement
mechanism is one of those provisions with such ‘extraordinary
preemptive power’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common law
complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well156
pleaded complaint rule.’”
For example, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the Supreme
Court held that Mississippi common law claims for tort, contract, and bad
157
faith were preempted by ERISA. A secondary, but equally important,
holding of that case created a connection between ERISA’s broad
158
preemption scheme and its limited remedial provisions. In this vein, the
Court concluded that allowing plaintiff’s common law claims would
159
undermine ERISA’s remedial scheme under section 502(a). The
majority in Pilot Life argued that Congress intended ERISA to serve as
160
the exclusive means of remedying violations under ERISA. In other
words, permitting the plaintiff’s state law claims was inconsistent with the
“comprehensive and reticulated” nature of these provisions as discussed
in Russell a couple of years before:

152. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
153. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
154. Id. at 66–67.
155. This doctrine does not usually apply outside of a few areas of the law because the “wellpleaded” complaint rule requires normally that the federal question be in the plaintiff’s complaint, not
in the defendant’s answer. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 9–10 (1983). Professor Medill has aptly referred to complete preemption as the “really badly
pleaded complaint exception” to the “well pleaded complaint rule.” See Medill, supra note 103, at
511.
156. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (quoting Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65–66).
157. 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).
158. See id. at 54.
159. Id. at 57.
160. Id.
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The deliberate care with which ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies
were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of
remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s civil
enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive. This conclusion
is fully confirmed by the legislative history of the civil enforcement
161
provision.

For reasons discussed elsewhere, this is not a plaintiff-friendly
development because plaintiffs would rather not have to bring their
claims under section 502(a)(1)(B), with its procedural difficulties and its
162
remedies being limited to the value of the benefits denied.
2. The Savings Clause, Preemption, and Intersectionality
But even where ordinary preemption does not exist for a claim
under section 514(a), because that claim is under a state law that
regulates insurance, complete preemption can still be utilized to remove
the claim from state court to federal court under ERISA. For example, in
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, in which a claim was brought under an
alternative remedial scheme against HMOs under Texas law, the statelaw claim was found to be completely preempted and removal of the
163
claim to federal court was permitted. Thereafter, even though the statelaw claim was saved, the Court found that a conflict preemption override
operated to invalidate the state law claim because that claim expanded
164
the remedies otherwise available under section 502(a)(1)(B). The
conflict preemption override exists so that additional remedies are not
available under state law and so that the fundamental purpose of
creating a uniform body of federal law to govern employee benefits plans
165
can be maintained. This state of affairs also leads to only limited
remedies being available under ERISA, which by extension means the
subsidiary purpose of ERISA—to keep the costs of adopting employee
166
benefits plans inexpensive for employers—is also furthered.
So, the Court in Davila appeared to be making a connection
between limited ERISA remedies and the secondary policy of keeping
plan costs low for plan sponsors. Although the Court paid lip service to
the primary purpose of protecting employee benefits, its devotion to
keeping plan costs low meant that it could not accept a structural
interpretation of ERISA which would lead to broader remedies for plan

161. Id. This last sentence about legislative history is just not accurate, as explored infra note 204.
162. See supra Part I.B.1.
163. 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).
164. Id. at 217–18 (“Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, then, even a state law that
can arguably be characterized as ‘regulating insurance’ will be pre-empted if it provides a separate
vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s remedial scheme.”).
165. Id. at 217.
166. Id. at 215 (“The limited remedies available under ERISA are an inherent part of the ‘careful
balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans.” (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55)).
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participants and beneficiaries. In short, complete preemption, conflict
preemption, limited remedies, and the elevation of a secondary purpose
of ERISA all work together to keep employees from receiving adequate
relief under either state law or ERISA.
3. Intersectionality Problems Under Sections 502(a)(2) and
502(a)(3)
Although not as common, even outside of section 502(a)(1)(B) and
complete preemption, preemption can act to force state-law claims into
federal court where they will be treated as federal claims under ERISA.
In other words, even though the lower courts are divided over whether
167
complete preemption even applies to sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3),
the intersectionality problem still potentially exists under sections
168
502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3). So, for instance, if a state-law claim is brought
for misconduct against a plan fiduciary and the claim can be recast as one
for a breach of fiduciary duty claim, or if a wrongful discharge claim is
brought and can be recast as a discrimination claim relating to benefits
under section 510, such claims can be found to “relate to” employee
169
benefits plans. As such, they are also conflict preempted into ERISA’s
limited remedial scheme.
B. Case Examples of the ERISA Intersectionality Problem
The impact of this state of affairs can be seen in numerous harsh
decisions by lower federal courts. Pilot Life and its progeny now stand
for the broader proposition that state common law claims having a
connection with an employee benefits plan are preempted.
Consequently, this principle has been relied on in defeating state law
claims for both plan administrators wrongfully denying or delaying
claims made under an employee benefits plan and for wrongful discharge
claims related to participants’ exercise of their rights under an employee
benefits plan.

167. Compare Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding
complete preemption for state law claims under section 502(a)), with Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l,
Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 270 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding no complete preemption for state law claims).
168. There is no removal issue under sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) because section 502(e)
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in federal court for these types of claims. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)
(2006). On the other hand, federal and state courts have dual jurisdiction under section 502(a)(1)(B).
See id.
169. See, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (preempting
negligence claims as “alternative enforcement mechanisms” for section 502(a)(2)); Romney v. Lin, 94
F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1996) (preempting state collections law because section 502(a)(3) already provided
a means for collecting delinquent ERISA contributions).
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1. Intersectionality and Denial of Benefits Claims
As far as wrongful denial of benefits claim scenarios, few are better
170
known than the case of Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc. In
Corcoran, a health plan denied a female plan participant extended
171
hospital stay services for a high risk pregnancy. The participant ended
up losing her baby, and she and her husband sued the plan for wrongful
172
death and under other tort theories of law. The court held, however,
that they could only bring a section 502(a)(1)(B) claim under ERISA
because the health plan’s decision to deny the requested benefits was an
employee-benefits-related eligibility determination, not a medical
173
decision which could be subject to a medical malpractice claim. Hence,
the application of both ERISA preemption and the exclusive nature of
the limited remedial scheme jointly prevented the parents from bringing
a state tort claim for compensatory and punitive damages for the loss of
174
their child.
Corcoran thus provides a jarring example of the intersectionality
problem and how ERISA civil enforcement and preemption provisions
work in tandem to deny employee benefits plan participants meaningful
175
relief for their losses caused by wrongful benefits decisions. Even the
judges deciding the case recognized the horrible inequities involved in a
case like this:
This [case outcome] is troubling for several reasons. First, it eliminates
an important check on the thousands of medical decisions routinely
made in the burgeoning utilization review system. With liability rules
generally inapplicable, there is theoretically less deterrence of
substandard medical decisionmaking. Moreover, if the cost of
compliance with a standard of care (reflected either in the cost of
prevention or the cost of paying judgments) need not be factored into
utilization review companies’ cost of doing business, bad medical
judgments will end up being cost-free to the plans that rely on these
176
companies to contain medical costs.

Corcoran is not alone in causing injustice in the denial-of-benefits
177
context where consequential injuries are involved. In fact, the Supreme
170. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). Professor Muir also discusses this case as evidence of the need
for better remedies under ERISA. See Muir, supra note 4, at 440.
171. 965 F.2d at 1324.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1338 (“The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no
remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake.”).
174. Id.
175. See Medill, supra note 4, at 843 (“The remedy offered by Section 502(a)(1)(B) in managed
care cases provides cold comfort to the widow or widower of the participant, and effectively no
compensation for the participant who has incurred personal injury or economic loss as a result of the
wrongfully denied claim for medical treatment.”).
176. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
177. For another heart-wrenching example, see Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2003),
where the plan’s refusal to pre-authorize a medical treatment for cancer—recommended by a
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Court case of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila illustrates another less tragic
but nonetheless recurrent scenario. Remember that in Davila the
plaintiffs sought consequential damages under state law for wrongful
denial of their claims by their HMOs which allegedly caused serious
179
injuries to them. The Supreme Court held that even if the Texas state
HMO law were saved from complete preemption, that law was still
180
preempted based on conflict preemption override. So rather than
receiving consequential damages for the benefits decisions that led to
harmful consequences, the plaintiffs were stuck under section
502(a)(1)(B) and could only obtain the inadequate value of the services
181
initially denied. All of this was done in the name of keeping remedies
under ERISA limited so that employers would continue to offer
182
employee benefits plans. In other words, the Supreme Court in Davila
promoted a secondary purpose of containing plan costs (not in ERISA)
over the primary purpose of protecting employee benefits (directly in the
statute), and in the process, continued to construe the remedial sections
of ERISA in a way that is inconsistent with ERISA’s clear legislative
183
history.
2. Intersectionality and Wrongful Discharge Claims
A similar cruel reality exists for claims brought for interference with
ERISA rights under section 510. Section 510 prohibits discriminating
against, retaliating against, or interfering with an employee’s exercise of
184
his or her rights under ERISA. Such claims require that the plaintiff
establish that the defendant has the intent to interfere with rights
185
protected by ERISA. Relief for violations of section 510 is available
186
under section 502(a)(3) for “appropriate equitable relief.”
participant’s treating physician—led to the deterioration of the participant’s physical condition to the
point where the recommended treatment was no longer a viable medical option by the time it was
finally authorized, and the patient died shortly thereafter.
178. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
179. Mr. Davila’s injuries resulted from Aetna’s refusal to pay for his Vioxx and the severe allergic
reaction he suffered when he took Naprosyn instead, which subsequently required extensive treatment
and hospitalization. Id. at 205. Ms. Calad, on the other hand, underwent surgery and, although her
treating physician recommended an extended hospital stay, CIGNA refused the request and she
allegedly experienced postsurgery complications forcing her to return to the hospital. Id.
180. Id. at 217–18.
181. See id. at 221. On the other hand, a state law providing for independent review of benefits
denials in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379–80 (2002), did not provide
additional remedies outside ERISA and, therefore, was saved from preemption as a law regulating
insurance. So it appears states can provide additional procedural protection through laws that regulate
insurance, but not additional remedies for the consequences of benefits denial.
182. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981) (noting that ERISA’s
primary goal was to benefit employees and that a secondary goal was to contain costs); see also 29
U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
183. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
185. See Schmall & Ihnes, supra note 142, at 107 (“A plaintiff’s claim under ERISA section 510
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Yet a number of cases involving state law claims for wrongful
discharge relating to employee benefits matters have been found
completely preempted and limited to the sections 510/502(a)(3)
187
framework. For example, in Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems
Corp., the plaintiff brought a tort claim in Texas state court based on
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when his employer
demoted and discharged him for his refusal to commit illegal acts and for
reporting the activities of another employee, both in relation to a pension
188
plan. Under the doctrine of complete preemption, the defendants
removed the claim to federal court and the district court dismissed it
189
because the complaint only contained a state law claim.
190
Relying on Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, which also involved
a state court action alleging wrongful discharge based on the employer’s
191
desire to avoid making contributions to his pension plan, the court
found that the state action would conflict with the express and carefully
crafted enforcement provisions found in the ERISA statute, specifically
192
sections 510 and 502(a)(3). Thus, applying the complete preemption
principle to these claims, the court found the state court action was
193
properly removed to federal court and then dismissed. In a last
observation, the Anderson court noted that “such a finding of
preemption does not hinge on whether ERISA provides the remedy the
must demonstrate specific intent by the employer to interfere with an employee’s benefits . . . .” (citing
Rush v. United Techs., 930 F.2d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1991))).
186. See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990).
187. See, e.g., Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 207 F.3d 674, 679 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding
allegations that Prudential discriminated against Wood by terminating his employment to avoid paying
benefits completely preempted by section 510).
188. 11 F.3d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir. 1994).
189. Id. at 1315. Although the court dismissed the case in Anderson, state claims may be treated as
federal claims under ERISA section 502(a) and analyzed as such. See Wood, 207 F.3d at 682
(Stapleton, J., dissenting) (“If a claim based on state law is completely preempted, however, it is
treated as a federal claim; a district court has federal question removal jurisdiction to entertain it, and
the claim, after removal, should go forward in the district court as a federal claim.”). Of course, one
problem then from the plaintiff’s standpoint is that the claim may be stale. See Watson v. Hartford Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 589 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455–56 (D. Del. 2008) (dismissing completely preempted
section 502(a) claim for failing to meet the applicable ERISA statute of limitations). Another problem
is that he or she may not be able to get a desirable remedy under the limited ERISA remedial scheme.
See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The acknowledged
absence of a remedy under ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme for medical malpractice committed in
connection with a plan benefit determination does not alter our conclusion. . . . [T]he lack of an
ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption analysis.”).
190. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
191. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
192. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314.
193. Id. (“McClendon compels us to conclude that Anderson’s wrongful discharge claim is
preempted insofar as it is based on his refusal to carry out violations of ERISA, and reporting such
violations to management.”). But see King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003)
(criticizing Anderson because “[w]e simply do not agree that the language of section 510 can be ‘fairly
construed’ to extend to [intra-office reports in a whistleblower context]”).
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plaintiff seeks or any remedy at all for the alleged wrong.” To
paraphrase, the Anderson court saw its function as mechanistically
applying the existing law of preemption and civil enforcement under
ERISA. And if deserving plaintiffs were left with a right without a
remedy, then so be it.
Because it is the central theme of this Article that Congress enacted
ERISA to provide “appropriate remedies” for employee benefits plan
195
violations that impact participants and beneficiaries, the following two
Parts propose both judicial and legislative fixes to this intersectionality
problem that leads to an unjust “right without remedy” statutory ruse.

III. The Judicial Fix: Embracing the Remedial Nature of ERISA
The current split on the Court over the meaning and scope of
ERISA’s remedial provisions provides an opportunity for future courts
in these types of ERISA intersectionality cases. Assuming that expansive
ERISA preemption will continue to lead to the preemption of state-law
claims, this Article focuses on the current, and erroneous, interpretation
of ERISA remedies as being limited. By reviewing the debate between
the literalist and remedialist Justices in the section 502(a) context since
Russell, the hope is to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize how the
broad remedialist view is more consistent with ERISA’s purpose, its text,
its structure, and its legislative history.
This Part is divided into two sections. Section A reviews the
arguments put forth by the literalist and remedialist Justices in ERISA
preemption and civil enforcement cases. Section B makes the argument
that the literalist Justices’ view based on “the days of the divided
196
bench” should be discarded and the Court should instead embrace a
197
broad remedial scheme, derived from the common law of trusts.

194. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314; see also Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333; Hansen v. Continental Ins.
Co., 940 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1991) (“This Court has held that ERISA’s preemption provision bars
state law causes of action even though such preemption may leave a victim . . . without a remedy.”).
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to
protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries . . . by providing for appropriate remedies . . . .”); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489, 515 (1996) (“We are not aware of any ERISA-related purpose that denial of a remedy would
serve. Rather, we believe that granting a remedy is consistent with the literal language of the statute,
the Act’s purposes, and pre-existing trust law.”).
196. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002).
197. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319 (“ERISA is, in its most important dimension, federal trust
law.”).
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A. Statutory Interpretation at the Heart of the Intersectionality
Problem
1. Russell and the Literalist Versus Remedialist Debate
198
As discussed above, almost from the very first case dealing with
the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a) of ERISA, a division
has existed on the U.S. Supreme Court between a group of Justices who
follow a literalist approach based on textual and structural arguments
and a group of Justices who follow a remedialist approach based on the
common law of trusts and the remedial nature of ERISA. Some Justices
have changed sides over the years (e.g., Justice Stevens), and different
groups have been successful in different cases over the years, but the
divide persists.
Recall that Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, a
section 502(a)(2) case, involved the question of whether the plaintiff
could seek compensatory and punitive damages for breach of fiduciary
199
The court was
duty beyond the receipt of retroactive benefits.
200
unanimous that such remedies did not exist, but it became a pivotal
case because of the deep division it engendered between different groups
of Justices on why such damage remedies were not available.
The literalists, led by Justice Stevens, found first that based on the
language of ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 409, only the plan was able to
201
receive relief, not an individual participant. Going further, Justice
Stevens examined the structure of 502(a) and found that there were “six
carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions” and that these
provisions were an “interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent
remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a ‘comprehensive and
202
reticulated statute.’” As such, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress
purposefully left out including any other types of remedies under section
203
502(a).
The remedialist Justices, led by Justice Brennan, could not have
disagreed more with the majority. Even putting to one side Justice
Stevens’s claim concerning the purported legislative history of the
204
drafting of ERISA, Justice Brennan believed that trust law should be

198. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text.
199. 473 U.S. 134, 136–38 (1985).
200. Id. at 148.
201. Id. at 140.
202. Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
203. Id. at 147 (“We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident
care as the one in ERISA.”).
204. See id. at 145–46. Although Justice Stevens was aware of the “voluminous legislative history
of the Act,” see id. at 145, his subsequent statement about that history calls into doubt whether he was
aware of all the relevant language in that record. In particular, he failed to note that both the House
and Senate Committee reports indicated that the enforcement provisions were intended to “provide
both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing
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the starting point for the interpretation of these remedial provisions since
Congress intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s equitable
205
remedies. The remedialist view would require “ascertaining the extent
to which trust and pension law as developed by state and federal courts
provide for recovery by the beneficiary above and beyond the benefits
206
that have been withheld.”
This view is also consistent with the statutory text and the
characterization of ERISA as a remedial statute. As for the literalist view
on the text, Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Russell examined section
502(a)(3) and noted that by its very terms, it allowed for “appropriate
equitable relief” to “‘redress’ ‘any act or practice which violates any
207
provision of this title or the terms of the plan.’” As for the structure of
section 502(a), the remedialists maintained that, far from being a
carefully-calibrated, limited remedial scheme, ERISA called for the
development of a federal common law to “fine-tune” ERISA’s remedial
208
provisions.
2. The Back-and-Forth Debate from Mertens to Sereboff
The literalists had the votes and won the first battle in this war of
ERISA statutory interpretation in Russell, but that debate continues with
mostly different Justices (Justice Stevens being the only one left from
Russell and now on the side of the remedialists).
209
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, discussed in detail in Part I.B, the
issue was whether or not a nonfiduciary service provider could be held
liable under section 502(a)(3) for money damages for assisting in a
210
fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty. The Court, with Justice Scalia now
writing for the literalist majority, ruled five-to-four that damage remedies
could never be “appropriate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3)
violations of [ERISA].” See S. Rep. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4871; H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; see also Robert N.
Eccles & David E. Gordon, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson: Supreme Court
Announces That It Was Not Kidding in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates., ERISA Litig. Rep., Feb. 2002,
at 6–8 (quoting an e-mail from Michael Gordon, one of the chief legislative architects of ERISA, in
which he maintained that references to “legal” relief were taken out of the final version of Section
502(a) to avoid “creat[ing] another cross for ERISA to bear as opponents of ERISA were . . . looking
for any opportunity at hand to stop the bill’s enactment.”).
205. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., concurring).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 153.
208. Id. at 155–57 (“ERISA’s legislative history also demonstrates beyond question that Congress
intended to engraft trust-law principles onto the enforcement scheme, and a fundamental concept of
trust law is that courts ‘will give to the beneficiaries of a trust such remedies as are necessary for the
protection of their interests.’ Thus ERISA was not so ‘carefully integrated’ and ‘crafted’ as to preclude
further judicial delineation of appropriate rights and remedies; far from barring such a process, the
statute explicitly directs that courts shall undertake it.” (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting
3 A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 199, at 1638 (1967))).
209. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
210. Id. at 249–50.
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because “[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic form of legal
211
relief.” Instead, only those remedies typically available in equity,
212
“injunction, mandamus, and restitution,” were available.
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Scalia rejected the law of trust
as a starting point and dubiously relied on “the days of the divided
213
bench” before the merger of the law and equity courts to conclude that
no type of monetary damages, even if incidental to equitable relief, were
214
available under section 502(a)(3). This interpretation was consistent
with the literalist Justices’ structural views of ERISA’s enforcement
scheme as being a well-crafted, limited statute and it being necessary to
differentiate between the equitable relief available under section
215
502(a)(3) and the legal relief available under other parts of the statute.
Of course, why it is necessary to go back hundreds of years to determine
the meaning of “equitable” in a statute passed in 1974 is anyone’s
216
guess.
217
The four remedialist justices, supported by the solicitor general
and following Justice Brennan’s lead in Russell, found that under the
common law of trusts, relief for breach of a trust had historically
included make-whole money damages:
[T]here being no common-law tradition either in law or in equity to
which Congress might direct the courts, it is not at all surprising that
Congress would refer to both legal and equitable relief in making clear
that the courts are free to craft whatever relief is most appropriate. It
seems . . . a treacherous leap to draw from these sections a
congressional intention to foreclose compensatory monetary awards
under § 502(a)(3) notwithstanding that such awards had always been
considered “appropriate equitable relief” for breach of trust at
218
common law.

It was inequitable, in the dissent’s view, that the majority’s approach
“stripped ERISA trust beneficiaries of a remedy against trustees and
third parties that they enjoyed in the equity courts under common

211. Id. at 255.
212. Id. at 256. Langbein has shown the folly of this statement, especially with regard to the fact
that neither mandamus nor restitution was typically available in equity. See Langbein, supra note 3, at
1353–54.
213. See Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002).
214. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–57.
215. Id. at 258–59.
216. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By 1974, when ERISA became
law, the ‘days of the divided bench’ were a fading memory, for that era had ended nearly 40 years
earlier with the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules instruct: ‘There shall be
one form of action’ cognizable in the federal courts.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 2)).
217. The remedialists included Justice White, writing in dissent, but for the first time included
former literalists: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Stevens. See Mertens, 508
U.S. at 249. On the other hand, Justice Blackmun joined the literalists in this opinion and Justice
Souter started out as one. See id.
218. Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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law.” In other words, ERISA was enacted to increase protections of
employee benefits, not to diminish those protections.
Instead, the focus of the literalists seemed to be on making sure that
sponsoring employee benefits plans was not expensive so that employers
220
would continue to provide them to their employees. The lowering of
administrative costs for plan sponsors is a “subsidiary” goal under
221
ERISA, but not one that is mentioned in the statute and clearly,
therefore, not on the same par as the primary purpose of providing
benefits to wronged employees. Yet in limiting the relief under section
502(a)(3), the literalists appear set on limiting remedies in order to meet
this all-important subsidiary goal of containing the costs of sponsoring
employee benefits plans, even though this interpretation of ERISA
necessarily undermines the primary purpose of the statute: to provide
appropriate sanctions to protect the employee benefits of participants
222
and their beneficiaries.
223
224
Three years later, in Varity Corp. v. Howe, the remedialists
gained the upper hand, albeit arguably limiting the section 502(a)(3)
remedy further by defining the term “appropriate” in “appropriate
225
equitable relief.” Varity involved a breach of fiduciary duty, and the
issue was whether individuals could advance a claim for breach of
226
fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3). In the six-to-three decision,
written by Justice Breyer, the Court held that ERISA authorized an
227
individual action for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3).
The remedialists characterized this section as a “‘catchall’ remedial
section,” which provides remedies beyond those found in section
228
502(a)(2).

219. Id. at 263.
220. Id. at 262–63 (majority opinion) (“Exposure to that sort of liability would impose high
insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence
upon ERISA plans themselves. There is, in other words, a ‘tension between the primary [ERISA] goal
of benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981))).
221. Id.
222. See supra note 3.
223. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
224. The remedialists now consisted of Justice Breyer, who wrote the majority opinion in Varity;
Justices Souter and Kennedy, who changed sides; Chief Justice Rehnquist; and Justices Ginsburg and
Stevens. See id. at 491. Justice O’Connor went back to the literalist side with Justices Scalia and
Thomas. See id.
225. Id. at 515.
226. Id. at 495–96.
227. Id. at 515.
228. Id. at 512. As section 502(a)(2) is the only provision that permits individuals to sue for
fiduciary breach, the majority in Varity concluded that the plaintiffs had a claim and that such a claim
would play an important deterrent function in protecting against wrongful conduct by fiduciaries. Id.
at 510–12. In this vein, the majority found it “hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize
breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy.” Id.
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Interestingly, the remedialists turned the structural argument
against the literalists, finding that although sections 502(a)(1)(B) and
502(a)(2) claims focused on specific areas, section 502(a)(3) was more
general in providing for “appropriate equitable relief” for “‘any’
229
statutory violation.” However, in coming to this conclusion, the
majority found that the word “appropriate” suggests that a remedy can
only be had under section 502(a)(3) if section 502 does not elsewhere
230
provide for an adequate remedy. Thus, although the opinion expands
the notion of equitable relief available to individuals under ERISA, it
also limits the statute’s scope by first asking whether any of the specific
remedial provisions apply. Three literalist Justices dissented from the
majority opinion, believing that such a catchall provision was inconsistent
with their analysis in Russell and with the carefully crafted structure of
231
section 502(a).
As it turns out, the remedialist victory was short-lived, as the
literalists were back in control a mere six years later with the throw-back
232
cases of Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson and
233
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. Both of these cases
involved plan reimbursement scenarios in which service providers were
seeking reimbursement from participants for medical payments already
234
made in third-party tort-recovery scenarios. For instance, in GreatWest, the issue was whether Great-West, a stop-loss insurer, could obtain
reimbursement from the plan beneficiary after she collected money both
from Great-West and from the third-party tortfeasor who had caused her
235
car accident injuries. In both cases, the literalists pushed their analysis

at 513.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 515 (“[T]he statute authorizes ‘appropriate’ equitable relief. . . . [W]here Congress
elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further
equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be ‘appropriate.’”). But see Medill, supra
note 4, at 886–87.
231. Varity, 516 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress has enacted a comprehensive
scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.”).
232. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
233. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
234. The participants had received third-party tort recoveries, and thus the service providers were
seeking reimbursement for those damages already received from third parties. See Sereboff, 547 U.S.
at 360; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 207–08.
235. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208–09. Janette Knudson was rendered quadriplegic by a car accident
in June 1992. Id. at 207. Her husband’s health plan covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses. Id.
Relying on a reimbursement provision in the plan, Great-West sought to require the Knudsons to pay
the Plan $411,157.11 from any proceeds recovered from third parties. Id. at 207–08. In fact, in late
1993, the Knudsons filed a tort action in California state court and a $650,000 settlement was
negotiated with the perpetrator of the car accident: $256,745.30 to a special-needs trust to provide for
Ms. Knudson’s medical care; $373,426 for attorney’s fees and costs; $5000 to reimburse the California
Medicaid program; and $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West’s claim under the reimbursement provision of
the Plan. Id.
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even further and divided the analysis between legal restitution and
equitable restitution, with only the latter being available under section
236
502(a)(3). So, in Great-West, the plan could not seek reimbursement
under section 502(a)(3) because the funds were in a special-needs trust
237
and not in the possession of the defendant. However, in Sereboff, such
funds could be recovered (as an equitable lien by agreement) because
there were specifically-identifiable funds in the possession of the
238
defendant that rightfully belonged to the plaintiff service provider. In
all, though, “[t]he spectrum of § 502(a)(3) relief contracted further in
239
Great-West” and in Sereboff.
The dissent in Great-West again criticized the anachronistic nature
of the majority’s statutory interpretation, objecting that the analysis was
240
not apt for “a distinctly modern statute Congress passed in 1974.”
Instead, the dissenting remedialist Justices said that the policy goals
would have been met by allowing the reimbursement clause to have been
enforced under section 502(a)(3) without having to worry about
241
“antiquarian” notions of restitution law.
Great-West’s twisted reasoning, going back to the days of equity,
causes even seasoned ERISA practitioners to refer to its holding as
242
“revolutionary.” On the one hand, it embraces the Mertens analysis
about “the days of the divided bench” and suggests that restitution may
not be available for individual claims for fiduciary breach if there is not
243
unjust enrichment. On the other hand, in a footnote, it suggests that
equitable relief in the form of back pay may be available for claims of
discrimination under a section 510 retaliation claim, but also that, “Title
244
VII has nothing to do with this case.” Not surprisingly, then, it has been
rightfully criticized as carrying out an erroneous historical analysis of
equitable remedies and applying an incorrect mode of statutory
245
interpretation to a modern remedial statute.

236. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212–13.
237. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214.
238. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362–63.
239. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2007).
240. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 233 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By 1974, when ERISA became law,
the ‘days of the divided bench’ were a fading memory, for that era had ended nearly 40 years earlier
with the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
241. Id. at 233–234.
242. See, e.g., Eccles & Gordon, supra note 204, at 28.
243. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212–14.
244. Id. at 218–19 n.4.
245. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 3; Medill, supra note 4; Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s
Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343 (2002); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary
Restitution, 55 SMU L. Rev. 1577 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 223 (2003); Schmall & Ihnes, supra note 142;
Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1063 (2003).
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Most recently, the Court had a chance to make another statement
about the remedial scope of section 502(a)(3) in Amschwand v. Spherion
Corp., which asks whether a participant or beneficiary in an ERISA
health benefits plan may sue for the insurance benefits that would have
246
been available but for a violation of a plan administrator’s duty. The
Fifth Circuit had held that they were constrained by Great-West from
granting make-whole relief under section 502(a)(3) for a breach of
247
fiduciary duty. The case would have effectively teed up the issue of
“make-whole relief” in an individual claim of fiduciary breach under
ERISA. Yet, even though the Solicitor General recommended granting
248
249
certiorari in Amschwand, the Supreme Court did not take the case,
and the issue remains very much alive at the time of the writing of this
Article.
In short, a tension very much remains between the remedialist
focus on the ability of courts to craft federal common law to decide issues
not expressly reached by the text of ERISA and the literalist emphasis
250
on the need to defer to the “carefully integrated” civil enforcement
scheme. To this point, and not surprisingly because of the general
majority the literalists have enjoyed on the Court since the 1985 Russell
decision, lower courts have basically continued to engage in a literalist
251
analysis of ERISA’s remedial provisions. But as one exasperated jurist
recently put it, these types of cases “scream out for a remedy beyond the
252
simple return of premiums.”
Considering this inequitable state of affairs under ERISA, the next
section argues that reconsideration of the primary purpose of ERISA, as
evidenced by its text, structure, and legislative history, inexorably lead to
the conclusion that section 502(a)(3) should be interpreted by the
Supreme Court to permit traditional trust law remedies of “make-whole”
relief to rectify any act or practice that violates any provision of
253
ERISA.

246. 505 F.3d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
247. Id.
248. See Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, SG Urges Cert. in Hulteen and
Amschwand, Not Gulino, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/05/sg-urges-cert-i.html
(May 28, 2008); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Amschwand v. Spherion Corp.,
128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (No. 07–841).
249. Amschwand, 505 F.3d 342, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008).
250. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985).
251. See, e.g., Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 348 (“Because the remedy sought here was not typically
available in pre-fusion courts of equity, we are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in
Great-West and deny § 502(a)(3) relief.”).
252. Id. at 348–49 (Benavides, J., specially concurring). Judge Benavides continued, “Regrettably,
under existing law it is not available.” Id. at 349.
253. At least two members of the current Court have signaled their willingness to reconsider the
availability of consequential damages under section 502(a)(3). See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542
U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[F]resh consideration of the availability of
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B. Embracing the Remedialist Approach of VARITY
To return to the primary purpose of protecting employee benefits, a
rather simple approach exists for expanding the scope of equitable relief
by following the Varity case and limiting both Great-West and Sereboff to
254
their facts as plan reimbursement cases. This approach is convincing
because it resonates with ERISA’s primary purpose of providing a
remedy for participants and beneficiaries. From a textual standpoint, the
language of section 502(a)(3), as Justice Brennan pointed out almost
twenty-five years ago, clearly contemplates equitable relief for “any” act
255
or practice that violates “any” provision of ERISA. From a structural
standpoint, six Justices agreed with Justice Breyer that although some of
the remedial provisions are specific, section 502(a)(3) is a catchall
provision that intimates the availability of a type of general relief to
256
make the plaintiff whole. Finally, as far as the legislative history goes,
not only are the Senate and House Committee Reports clear that the
remedial provisions were to be interpreted broadly, but Michael Gordon,
257
a chief architect of ERISA as a congressional staffer in the 1970s, has
written, “[Justice] Scalia is off the mark in holding fast to the myth that
the ERISA authors only intended to enact ‘typical’ equitable remedies
258
and that they rejected the law-equity merger process, then at its peak.”
All in all, and as Professor Langbein persuasively puts it, ERISA
was meant to “replicate the core principles of trust remedy law, including
259
the make-whole standard of relief.” The time has certainly come for

consequential damages under § 502(a)(3) is plainly in order.”).
254. In this regard, one of the more bizarre aspects of both Great-West and Sereboff was the almost
complete absence of any mention of the importance of protecting the plan benefits promised to plan
participants. Of course, the plaintiffs in these cases were insurance companies seeking reimbursement
from participants, see Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207–09 (2002);
Sereboff v. Mid. Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 359–61 (2006), so maybe the Court was
disinclined to place these policy issues into the mix. That fact may also make it easier for future courts
to distinguish participant and beneficiary cases (relying on the Varity model) from insurance company
subrogation and reimbursement cases (relying on the Mertens model). But see Amschwand, 505 F.3d at
347 (“Amschwand’s proposed distinction among defendants has been rejected by many of our sister
circuits. There is no textual argument for drawing this distinction under § 502(a)(3). Under GreatWest, only the nature of the claim and the relief sought—not the status of the litigants—determine the
scope of available § 502(a)(3) recovery.”).
255. Russell, 437 U.S. at 153 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
256. See supra Part III.A.2.
257. See Mary Williams Walsh, Pensions: Big Holes in the Net, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2005, at G1.
258. See Medill, supra note 103, at 580–81 (citing e-mail from Michael Gordon in Eccles &
Gordon, supra note 204). Gordon has been widely recognized as one of the most influential
Congressional staffers during the enactment of ERISA and as minority counsel to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare from 1970–1975. Id. at 15–16 & n.c. He is reported to have
played a role in nearly every political issue addressed during ERISA’s enactment. See id. at 15 n.c.
259. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 224 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting
Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319).
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the Court to “revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA
260
regime.”

IV. Legislative Fixes: Proposed Sections 3(43) and 502(a)(11)
Additionally, Congress should reevaluate section 502(a)(3) and
interpret it to provide remedies that will more likely meet ERISA’s
primary goals of protecting employees’ benefits. In this vein, Congress
should provide a definition for “appropriate equitable relief” in section
502(a)(3) and, more dramatically, add language similar to that of the
261
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and permit capped compensatory and
punitive damages under ERISA in certain types of cases. This Part
considers each of those possibilities.
A. Amending the Remedial Language of Section 502(a)(3)
To better provide protection for employees’ benefits, Congress
should amend ERISA to more specifically define the nature of the
262
equitable relief available under section 502(a)(3). Additionally, so that
these remedies are not limited to scenarios where other remedies under
section 502(a)(1)(B) for benefits or section 502(a)(2) are otherwise not
available, additional language should be added to define the relationship
between section 502(a)(3) and the other remedial sections.
More specifically, ERISA section 3, the definitional section, should
be amended to add proposed section 3(43) to define the phrase
“appropriate equitable relief” in section 502(a)(3). The idea here would
be to provide a definition based on familiar equitable language found in
other federal employment law statutes. In fact, in the Mertens decision,
the majority acknowledged that the Court in the past had used similar
263
equitable language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
264
Consistent with some lower federal courts, this reference to
similar remedial language in Title VII forms the basis for the definition
set forth in proposed section 3(43), and makes it possible by extension

260. See id. at 222 (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker, J., concurring)).
261. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006).
262. This amendment should expressly state that it only applies to single-employer plans under
ERISA. Both multiemployer plans (involving union trust funds) and multiple employer plans (involving
the pooling of resources of smaller employers) raise other important issues not addressed by this Article
and should be considered separately to determine whether these new provisions should apply to them.
263. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (“And though we have never interpreted
the precise phrase ‘other appropriate equitable relief[]’ [in ERISA,] we have construed the similar
language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (before its 1991 amendments) . . . .”); see also
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). But see Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins.
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 218–19 n.4. (2002) (making a textualist argument that back pay is not
actually a form of equitable relief under Title VII).
264. See, e.g., Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 145–47 (2d Cir. 1999).
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for ERISA plaintiffs to obtain make-whole relief in appropriate cases.
That section would simply state: “The term ‘appropriate equitable relief’
means the same type of equitable relief available under section 706(g)(1)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”
Section 706(g)(1), in turn, states in pertinent part:
[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . , or any other
266
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

Over the years, this language has been interpreted to allow for a
wide range of equitable remedies, including various forms of “make267
whole” relief such as reinstatement, back pay, and front pay. Such a
provision would also have the advantage of relying on an established
provision that has been consistently interpreted over the years.
At the same time, an additional sentence should be added to
proposed section 3(43) to make clear that the awarding of equitable
relief under section 502(a)(3) does not require that there be no relief
available under any other remedial sections, as the Varity case currently
268
suggests. This is especially important for denial of benefits claims that
include requests for consequential damages. In this regard, the second
sentence of this proposed section should read: “Relief under section
502(a)(3) does not require that there be no other relief available under
other provisions of section 502(a), only that the relief be ‘appropriate’ for
the harm suffered by the plaintiff.”
This second sentence is an important addition also because of
judicial developments in the case of LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
269
Associates, Inc. Although the holding of the case is that individual
401(k) account holders can sue to make their accounts whole for
270
wrongful conduct under section 502(a)(2), there was an attempt by
Chief Justice Roberts in his concurrence to limit access to relief under

265. Accord Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319 (“Congress . . . intended ERISA to replicate the core
principles of trust remedy law, including the make-whole standard of relief.”).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1).
267. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1990); see
also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
268. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
269. 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).
270. Id. at 1026. I initially believed that the Court would also decide whether LaRue could bring
his breach of fiduciary claim under section 502(a)(3) for “appropriate equitable relief.” See Posting of
Paul Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, Reflections on the LaRue Decision, http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/02/reflections-on.html (Feb. 20, 2008). Although that
was the provision under which LaRue filed his case, the Court decided that it was not necessary to
address issues about whether make-whole relief was available under section 502 (a)(3) in order to
come to a decision in the case. Larue, 128 S. Ct. at 1023.
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502(a)(2). Specifically, Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy,
questioned whether relief could be had under section 502(a)(2) before a
plaintiff goes through the more tricky procedural roller coaster of a
272
denial of benefits claim under section 502(a)(1)(B). The argument is
that the LaRue case is really not a fiduciary breach case under section
502(a)(2), but rather a denial of benefits case under section 502(a)(1)(B),
273
subject to exhaustion and Firestone discretion. Consequently, the
concurrence suggests that lower federal courts in the future should
consider whether section 502(a)(1)(B) applies in a case like this and, if
so, whether there must be exhaustion of internal remedies before the
section 502(a)(2) issue is reached, if at all.
Although it is highly doubtful that LaRue is a benefits case being
274
mischievously recast as a fiduciary one, to the extent lower federal
courts follow Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence, it has the potential to
undermine the holding of the LaRue majority and further restrict
remedial relief for ERISA plaintiffs. Combined with the language in
Varity that suggests that “appropriate” in “appropriate equitable relief”
means that section 502(a)(3) relief is only available if no other remedy
275
exists, the presence of the second sentence in proposed section 3(43) is
imperative.
B. The ERISA Civil Rights Act: Section 502(a)(11)
In addition to the proposed section 3(43) amendment, Congress
should attack the intersectionality problem in ERISA by making a
legislative move that it has previously made in the employmentdiscrimination law context. To the extent that reinstatement, back pay,
and other equitable “make-whole relief” is insufficient to provide
adequate relief caused by denials of benefits, breaches of fiduciary duty,
276
or wrongful discharges, Congress could pass an ERISA Civil Rights

271. Id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1026–27 (“If LaRue may bring his claim under § 502(a)(1)(B), it is not clear that he may
do so under § 502(a)(2) as well. Section 502(a)(2) provides for ‘appropriate’ relief. Construing the
same term in a parallel ERISA provision, we have held that relief is not ‘appropriate’ under
§ 502(a)(3) if another provision, such as § 502(a)(1)(B), offers an adequate remedy.”).
274. The problem with Chief Justice Roberts’s argument is that there were no benefits to be had.
In a 401(k) plan, a participant is only entitled to his account balance, which LaRue had already
received. See Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the Writ at 2, LaRue, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (No. 06-856)
(“[W]hile the case was still pending before the Fourth Circuit, [LaRue] withdrew all of his funds from
his account.”) LaRue first needed to establish that there had been a breach of fiduciary duty in order
to get his lost earnings into the plan before he could make a claim for benefits. It would help in these
cases if Congress would clarify that circumstances involving both a breach of fiduciary duty and a
claim for benefits can be combined into one suit.
275. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
276. Consider the pitfalls of solely relying on reinstatement or back pay for these types of claims.
Reinstatement is often impossible because by the time it is ordered, the employee has long since taken
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Act based on the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Importantly, such legislation
would permit ERISA plaintiffs to receive consequential damages in
appropriate cases. This is significant because equitable relief, even when
including back pay and other make-whole relief, does not compensate
for the significant consequential damages of job loss or loss of benefits
(e.g., health insurance expenses, mortgage foreclosure, family disruption
caused by inability to pay school expenses, or the necessity of moving the
278
family to take a new job).
A reconsideration of the Corcoran case from Part II, in which Mrs.
Corcoran lost her baby because of a benefits determination by her
managed care company, illustrates the problem with merely relying on
279
an expanded equitable relief definition. In Corcoran, Mrs. Corcoran
had to settle for the value of the hospital services she was denied under
section 502(a)(1)(B) and was not able to bring a wrongful death claim for
the death of her child because that claim was preempted under the
280
holding of Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.
Under the proposed amendment to section 3(43), a future Mrs.
Corcoran might be able to obtain “make-whole” relief under an
expanded definition of equity under section 502(a)(3). Yet, although her
economic loss would be addressed, it is unclear how Mrs. Corcoran can
receive the relief she deserves for pain and suffering without the ability
to receive substantial consequential damages, in the form of both
compensatory and punitive damages, for the loss of her child. In short,
only the addition of monetary damages in the form now available under
employment discrimination laws would serve that need. However, to
keep this new legislation consistent with the primary purposes of ERISA,

another job. See Charlie J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the
NLRA and RLA, 2 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 317, 338–39 (1998) (citing Elvis C. Stephens & Warren
Chaney, A Study of the Reinstatement Remedy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 Lab. L.J. 31
(1974)). Even when reinstatement is a possibility, studies indicate that employees may be fired shortly
after being reinstated for “other” reasons or may just quit because of the hostility they face in the
workplace. Id. Moreover, years of delay between the wrongful discharge and the reinstatement give
the employer the benefit of its illegal conduct. As to back pay, the expense of litigation eats up the
entirety of a back pay award for all but the most highly-compensated employees and thus makes it
difficult for employees to find legal representation. The Author would like to thank Professor Richard
A. Bales for these insights.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006). Another version of this idea of combining ERISA’s remedial
scheme with the capped damage remedies of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has been suggested by
Professor Dana Muir. See Dana Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise, 81
Iowa L. Rev. 1, 52 (1995). Professor Muir’s initial insight makes even more sense in light of the
intervening fourteen years of preemption and remedies cases since her article on section 510 remedies.
278. Following Professor Medill’s example, I limit make-whole relief here to “a monetary award
calculated to restore the plaintiff’s economic losses.” See Medill, supra note 4, at 926. Back pay would
be one such remedy. On the other hand, I limit compensatory damages to mean a “monetary award
designed to compensate the plaintiff for physical and emotional pain and suffering.” See id.
279. See 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
280. See 481 U.S. 41 (1987); see also supra notes 170–74.
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these types of damages would only be awarded if available equitable
relief would not provide a meaningful remedy. Thus, although Mrs.
Corcoran would be eligible for compensatory damages for pain and
suffering and punitive damages, if the necessary reckless disregard and
malice were proven, other plaintiffs like Mr. LaRue and Mr. Dedeaux
would be limited to appropriate equitable damages unless they could
show that the wrongful conduct caused consequential damages not
sufficiently addressed by equitable relief.
In order to make this distinction more clear, such compensatory
claims could only be brought under section 502(a)(3) alone or combined
with section 510. Section 502(a)(3) alone would address claims for denial
of benefits and breach of fiduciary duties which lead to consequential
damages, while section 502(a)(3) combined with section 510 would
address similar claims for relief in the wrongful discharge and retaliation
context. In order to make these consequential claims consistent with
employment discrimination law, and not suffer from the same
281
enforcement weaknesses associated with current section 510 claims, the
proposed section will require that the plaintiff establish that the
defendant has the intent to interfere with rights protected by ERISA.
Focusing eligibility for compensatory and punitive damages on intent
determinations would have the advantage of being able to use the wellestablished proof schemes from employment-discrimination law to ferret
282
out the necessary intent from circumstantial evidence.
Within these parameters, the proposed ERISA Civil Rights Act
would mimic the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in important respects. The
ERISA Civil Rights Act would provide under proposed section
502(a)(11):
(a) In an action brought by a complaining party under section
502(a)(3) alone, or in conjunction with section 510, of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) against a
respondent who has unlawfully denied benefits, breached fiduciary
duties, or interfered with the protected rights of an ERISA participant
or beneficiary, any of which causes consequential damages, the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any appropriate

281. The weakness of the current section 510 regime is highlighted by the case of McGann v. H &
H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991). In McGann, an employer reduced the lifetime coverage
amount under a health plan for HIV/AIDS from $1 million to $5000 after it discovered that one of its
employees had contracted the disease. Id. at 403. The court reasoned that this was not a discriminatory
act under section 510 because: (1) there was no promise that the employer would keep the high
coverage limit forever and the plan contemplated that it could be modified or terminated at any time,
(2) the change in coverage would apply to all participants and not just to the participant who currently
had the disease, and (3) ERISA does not prohibit health plan discrimination between or among
different category of diseases. Id. at 406–08.
282. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).
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relief authorized by section 502(a) of ERISA, from the respondent.
283
Plan assets may not be used for the payment of these damages.

Subsection (b), in turn, would provide:
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages.
(1) Determination of punitive damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent unlawfully denied benefits, breached fiduciary duties, or
interfered with protected rights under ERISA, with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual.
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of equitable relief
authorized under section 502(a) of ERISA.

To assuage employers’ concerns about large liability awards, which might
cause them not to voluntarily sponsor employee benefits plans, the same
compensatory and punitive damage caps in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
would be implemented. These caps would be based on the size of the
employer being sued:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party—
(A) in the case of a respondent who has fewer than 101 employees,
$100,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees, $200,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees, $350,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees,
284
$500,000.

Finally, because employees would have the right to sue for
compensatory and punitive damages, the Seventh Amendment requires
that plaintiffs under proposed section 502(a)(11)(c) be able to demand a
285
jury trial. Not only would the ability to have a jury trial be consistent

283. This last sentence is necessary because it could prove very problematic if a court held that a
401(k) plan improperly denied benefits and had to satisfy that judgment with plan assets.
284. I approximate higher caps here to take inflation into account since the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006) (providing right to jury trial in employment discrimination
actions seeking compensatory or punitive damages); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974)
(interpreting Seventh Amendment right to jury trial to extend to statutory claims that involve “legal
rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law”).
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with the framework of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but it would also
provide employees and their beneficiaries with the opportunity to
explain the inequities of their situation to their peers and try to prove
their right to consequential damages.
Now, some may object that such a scheme would cause employers to
287
no longer sponsor employee benefits plans. But this is highly unlikely
both because of the substantial tax benefits that would be lost by the
employer and because such employers would be at a competitive
disadvantage compared to competitor employers who continued to offer
288
such benefits plans. Additionally, this proposed amendment would
most likely just cause employers to write their plans even more explicitly
and give even greater consideration to the denial of a claim. And unlike
in the Title VII context where plaintiffs can go beyond the damage caps
289
or parallel state
by relying on other federal laws, like § 1981,
290
antidiscrimination law, the presence of broad federal preemption
would make the availability of consequential damages beyond the
designated caps very unlikely. Furthermore, punitive-damage language
similar to that of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would mean that the
proposed amendment would be interpreted under the Kolstad v.
291
American Dental Ass’n line of cases, with the likely result that punitive
damages would only be awarded in cases where the employer did not act
292
in good faith to comply with ERISA.

286. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
287. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993).
288. Another possibility, which would make this problem disappear, is requiring a mandatory payor-play system for employer sponsorship of all employee benefits plans. Such a scheme is currently
being considered as part of President Obama’s health care reform proposal. See Sarah Barr, Health
Care: Senate HELP Bill Would Cost $611 Billion; Democrats Unveil More Coverage Provisions, BNA
Daily Lab. Rep., July 6, 2009, at A-8 (“The employer mandate included in the amendment would
require employers with 25 or more employees to offer adequate insurance coverage and contribute at
least 60 percent to the cost of monthly premiums—or face a penalty. Employers would be charged
$750 annually for each full-time employee and $375 annually for each part-time employee without
coverage, a provision that would generate $52 billion over 10 years, according to CBO and the Joint
Committee on Taxation.”).
289. See 42 U.S.C. 1981 (2006).
290. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual
Harassment Awards, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1, 4–5 (2006) (discussing circumvention of Title VII
damage caps through state law causes of action).
291. 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), holding that employment
discrimination plaintiffs may seek punitive damages where an employer has engaged in
“discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of
an aggrieved individual.”). Under Kolstad, the focus is “on whether an employer discriminated against
an employee in the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate federal law.” See Paul M.
Secunda, A Public Interest Model For Applying Lost Chance Theory To Probabilistic Injuries In
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 747, 778 n.184.
292. Id. at 545 (“[I]n the punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for
the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to
the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’” (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n,
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Perhaps most importantly, and the best response to potential critics,
is that the availability of meaningful remedies for plaintiffs under the law
would finally act as an effective deterrent against employers, plan
administrators, and insurance companies wrongfully denying or delaying
benefits for employees, breaching fiduciary duties, and wrongfully
293
discharging employees for exercise of their rights under ERISA. In the
end, because of the availability of consequential damages, ERISA’s
primary purpose of protecting employee benefits would more likely be
vindicated.

Conclusion
The current unsatisfactory state of affairs for employee participants
and their beneficiaries under ERISA is not a consequence of litigation
tactics or what is wrought by a proper interpretation of ERISA, but can
better be attributed to ERISA’s intersectionality problem of broad
preemption and limited remedies. It is at this intersection of the
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption and remedial provisions that the
Court has been most effective in shielding employers from employee
benefits liability.
To rectify this situation, this Article proposes a number of different
solutions from both judicial and legislative perspectives. Judicially, the
Supreme Court should embrace the remedial nature of ERISA and find
that equitable relief may include “make whole” relief available in other
employment statutes and, more generally, under the common law of
trusts. Additionally, Congress should add a new definitional section,
proposed section 3(43), to define “appropriate equitable relief,” which
would expand the relief available under section 502(a)(3) and turn that
section into a true “catch-all” regardless of what other relief is available
under other provisions of section 502(a). Finally, to restore fairness to
the most harsh case outcomes under ERISA, this Article proposes
adding section 502(a)(11), which would provide recovery of capped
compensatory and punitive damages in those cases that require
consequential damages for employees to receive an effective remedy.
In short, only by undertaking to provide these types of expanded
remedies will ERISA once more become an employee security act and
cease being a shelter from legal accountability for unscrupulous
294
employers, plan administrators, and other fiduciaries.

139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting))).
293. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (noting that a 502(a)(3) claim for individual
relief for breach of fiduciary duty would be important deterrent against wrongful conduct by fiduciaries).
294. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“‘gaping
wound’ caused by the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as interpreted by this
Court, will not be healed until the Court ‘start[s] over’ or Congress ‘wipe[s] the slate clean’”) (alteration
in original) (quoting Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part))).

